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Ho-fung Hung and Iam-chong Ip

Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement and the Making of
China’s Offshore Civil Society
A B S T R AC T

Hong Kong’s civil society has remained vibrant since the sovereignty handover in
1997, thanks to an active defense by the democratic movement against Beijing’s
attempts to control civil liberties. Hong Kong is becoming mainland China’s offshore
civil society, serving as a free platform for information circulation and organizing
among mainland activists and intellectuals.
KEYWORDS: Hong Kong, China, democratic movement, civil society

I n tr o d u c ti o n

Since Hong Kong’s return to China as a special administrative region (SAR) in
1997, many commentators and journalists have fretted about the territory’s
declining liberty and autonomy, as well as its stalled or even reversed democratic development. Plentiful examples of self-censorship of the press, repeated
delays in implementation of universal suffrage as promised in the Basic Law,
and Beijing’s open or tacit interventions into Hong Kong politics despite the
stated principle of “one country, two systems” suggest that Hong Kong has
been passively and gradually subordinated to the authoritarian state in Beijing.
“One country, two systems” is now devoid of all substance, and Hong Kong
society and politics are being homogenized with those in mainland China.
This pessimistic portrayal of Hong Kong as a “slowly boiled frog”1 after 1997
cannot be easily dismissed, as evidence attesting to it abounds. One weakness
Ho-fung Hung is Associate Professor of Sociology at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland,
U.S.A. He is the author of Protest with Chinese Characteristics: Demonstrations, Riots, and Petitions in the
Mid-Qing Dynasty (2011) and edited China and the Transformation of Global Capitalism (2009). Iamchong Ip is Senior Teaching Fellow of Cultural Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. He is the
editor of Social Media Uprising in the Chinese-Speaking World (2011). They thank the editor and anonymous
reviewers of Asian Survey for their comments, and Daniel Thompson for his copy editing assistance.
1. Many commentators in Hong Kong equate the slow tightening of liberty there under Chinese
rule to the process of “slowly boiling a frog” (wenshui zhuwa), in which the frog does not notice the
slow increase in temperature and does not resist.
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of this perspective, however, is that it neglects the tenacity of Hong Kong’s civil
society, which germinated in late colonial times and has actively defended its
autonomy since the handover. Despite pressure from Beijing, this civil society,
which has remained at least as vibrant as before the handover, has even started
to resonate with the growing grassroots resistance in mainland China that has
emerged in recent years. The former colony’s distinct financial infrastructure
that originated in colonial times is now enabling Hong Kong to become China’s
offshore financial center, facilitating the emergent internationalization of the
Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB).2 Likewise, Hong Kong’s civil society is
turning into mainland China’s offshore civil society, serving as a clearinghouse
for information and ideas, a hub of political organizing and exchanges, and an
open, free platform for activists and intellectuals from the mainland.
The persistence and growth of Hong Kong’s civil society after 1997 was not an
outcome of any stable institutional protection. Instead, it has resulted from active
resistance by various social and political actors against Beijing’s persistent attempts
to constrict such a public space. In what follows, we first outline how Hong Kong’s
contentious civil society took shape and gained momentum in the 1980s. We then
explain how this civil society persisted and grew after 1997, and how Hong Kong’s
post-handover political economy kept Beijing from openly repressing such a civil
society. Its tenacious growth, coupled with the strengthening of the oligarchic
political structure that Hong Kong inherited, led to the escalation of contentious
mobilizations in 2003 and 2010. These alarmed Beijing and successfully forced
officials to make concessions on Hong Kong’s political reform and, more significantly, to delay draconian anti-sedition legislation indefinitely. We will discuss
the repercussions of these mobilizations among concerned citizens in mainland
China. We will then explore how these repercussions, together with intensifying
exchanges among scholars, journalists, activists, and other active citizens from
Hong Kong and the mainland, have started to create China’s offshore civil society
in Hong Kong.
T H E R ise a n d Persiste n c e o f H o n g K o n g ’ s Ci v il S o c iety

In the decade following the failed 1967 anti-British insurgency, instigated
by Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-affiliated organizations in Hong Kong
2. Chen Xiaoli and Cheung Yin-Wong, “Renminbi Going Global,” China and World Economy
19:2 (March-April 2011), pp. 1–18; and Paola Subacchi, “One Currency, Two Systems,” International
Economics (October 2010, IEBP2010/01), pp. 1–12.
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under the influence of the Cultural Revolution, leftist groups maintained a
low profile, having alienated many Hong Kong citizens with their terrorist
tactics used toward the end of the uprising. At the same time, a new wave
of student and social movements constituted by labor organizations, teachers’ unions, and community organizations blossomed among the younger
generation. Activists in these movements criticized both authoritarian rule
in China and colonial British rule in Hong Kong. They gained coverage in
local media, increasingly staffed by a younger generation of more critical and
independent-minded journalists. These movements were the foundation of
an emerging civil society in Hong Kong.3
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the opening of Sino-British negotiations
and the countdown to Hong Kong’s sovereignty handover created many
opportunities for this nascent civil society to grow. The British regime, foreseeing its inevitable departure, started to initiate long-delayed democratic
reforms to shore up its legitimacy. It increased the proportion of popularly
elected seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo). Through the same period,
Beijing was eager to build a broad, united front in support of the sovereignty
handover and promised autonomy and democracy in the future Hong Kong
SAR (HKSAR). The prospect of political reforms led many social movement
groups to coalesce into an alliance in pursuit of broader democratization.
Their alliances later developed into pro-democracy political parties; the largest since its inception in 1994 was the Democratic Party. These parties, in
partnership with an array of social movement groups, became significant
forces in defending and building Hong Kong’s civil society in late colonial
and postcolonial times.
Amid the 1980s efforts to formulate the Basic Law—the post-handover
mini-Constitution of Hong Kong—Beijing tilted heavily toward the local
business elite, supporting them in practically all controversial issues. Chinese
officials vetoed all proposals advocated by the democrats for social reform
(such as workers’ rights to bargain collectively) and speedy political reform
(e.g., implementation of universal suffrage in 1997) in the completed initial
drafts of the Law in late 1988 and early 1989.4 The mounting conflict between
3. Lui Tai-lok and Stephen W. K. Chiu, “Social Movements and Public Discourse on Politics,”
in Hong Kong’s History: State and Society under Colonial Rule, ed. Ngo Tak-wing (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 101–18.
4. Alvin Y. So, Hong Kong’s Embattled Democracy: A Societal Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1999).
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Hong Kong’s democrats and Beijing culminated in massive mobilization in
support of the student movement in China in 1989. Waves of demonstrations
surged in the colony, with up to one million Hong Kong citizens—one-sixth
of its population at the time—participating. A number of core democrats
and social movement groups founded the Hong Kong Alliance in Support
of Patriotic Democratic Movements (HKASPDM). After the Tiananmen
crackdown and the full-fledged conservative turn of Chinese politics, Beijing
labeled the democrats, who had strongly denounced the crackdown, traitors
collaborating with foreign powers to topple the CCP regime. They continue
to be so labeled to this day. On the other hand, many Hong Kong citizens
see the democrats as trusted defenders of Hong Kong’s liberty after 1997, as
suggested by the stable majority vote they have obtained in nearly all direct
elections.
The final version of the Basic Law, passed in 1990, reinstated the promise
of eventual election of the Hong Kong chief executive and all LegCo seats
through universal suffrage. But implementation was delayed indefinitely, with
the document asserting that the former could not occur earlier than 2007 and
the latter only after 2008. In addition, officials inserted a draconian article
against subversion, Article 23, requiring the future HKSAR government to
outlaw any activities, organizations, and publications deemed threatening
to Beijing.
After the handover, election of the chief executive was carried out by the
Election Committee. This committee of several hundred members mainly
consisted of prominent magnates in the city. These proxies for Beijing fiercely
opposed universal suffrage for fear that it would end their privileged access
to the policy making process. Direct election for LegCo seats was limited,
with Beijing rolling back some of the LegCo democratic reforms instituted
during the last years of British rule. The openness of the political system fell
far short of Beijing’s initial promise of universal suffrage.5
Increasingly marginalized by Beijing, the democratic movement resorted
to mass mobilization after 1997 to demand faster democratization. The
democrats, who participated enthusiastically in direct elections begun by
5. In accordance with the Basic Law’s Article 45, the ultimate goal of Hong Kong’s political
development is universal suffrage. However, the timetable remains open; the electoral law could be
amended to achieve it. The Beijing government and pro-Beijing politicians have attempted to delay
it by promoting the idea of “gradual reform.” On April 26, 2004, the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress explicitly denied the possibility of reaching universal suffrage by 2007
(for the chief executive) and by 2008 (for LegCo).
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the British, were active in both community organizing and collective action.
Besides pressing the quest for formal democracy, they have organized Hong
Kong-wide campaigns on particular contentious issues since the 1980s. A
case in point was their cooperation with environmental groups in large-scale
mobilization against the construction of the Daya Bay nuclear plant near
Hong Kong following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.
The gap between the promise and reality of Hong Kong’s political development after 1997 became the impetus for the continuous growth of the
democratic movement. Every year on the July 1 anniversary of the sovereignty handover, pro-democracy parties and social movement groups organized
carnival-like demonstrations, creating a broad-based “rainbow coalition” that
made diverse demands for minimum-wage legislation, gay rights, housing
rights, and universal pensions. These were unified under the demand for
universal suffrage.
Beijing’s choices in eliminating the opposition in Hong Kong were constricted because outright repression was out of the question. Given the existing vibrant civil society, any open repression would trigger unpredictable
turmoil in the territory. This would likely jeopardize Beijing’s plan to use
Hong Kong as an example for any future unification of China and Taiwan.
Civil unrest would also threaten China’s stated plan to reshape Hong Kong as
an offshore financial center for internationalization of the RMB, requiring a
credible legal structure, freedom of the press, and above all political stability.
Popular rage directed at local ruling circles mounted in Hong Kong as
the government proved incapable of reviving the economy after the Asian
financial crisis of 1997–98. Its failure to contain the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic in 2003 only made matters worse. At the peak
of discontent (see Figure 1), the government, under pressure from Beijing,
initiated the anti-subversion legislation as predicated in the Basic Law in
Article 23. Many otherwise non-activist scholars, journalists, and librarians,
as well as the Catholic Church and many Protestant congregations, joined
the democrats to oppose the legislation; they saw it as a grave threat to existing freedoms of speech and of association enjoyed since late colonial times.
The culmination of popular discontent was the massive demonstration on
the sixth anniversary of the handover on July 1, 2003, when more than half a
million protesters took to the streets. Spurred by the main theme of opposing
the Article 23 legislation, the demonstration drew enthusiastic participation
by youngsters who came of age after 1997. The demonstrators expressed a
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figure 1. Opinion Poll Survey Showing Percentage of Respondents Satisfied or Dissatisfied with
the Hong Kong Government, 1993–2010
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source : Hong Kong Transition Project, Calm after the Storm? Hong Kong People Respond to Reform, <www.
hktp.org/list>, 2010.

wide range of concerns including the need for universal suffrage by 2007–08;
they also issued attacks on business monopolies.
In response, Beijing acquiesced to an indefinite suspension of the Article 23
legislation process. In 2005, Beijing fired its handpicked chief executive, Tung
Chee Hwa, partway through his second term. Tung, also head of a prominent
business family, had become a primary target for the demonstrators. He was
replaced in his government post by Donald Tsang, who had been a senior
bureaucrat late in the colonial administration. By these actions Beijing apparently sought to enable the HKSAR government to sidestep popular charges
of collusion with big business.
After making these two concessions, Beijing pushed back against the democrats’ growing demand for universal suffrage in 2007–08. The Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress ruled in 2004 that universal
suffrage would be out of the question for 2007–08. Given the Hong Kong
government’s repeated failures to revitalize the local economy, Beijing pressed
for a Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Hong Kong in
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2003 that brought swift economic recovery. The agreement accelerated and
deepened Hong Kong’s economic and social integration with China, opening the floodgates for mainland-to-Hong Kong flows of capital, visitors, and
migrating professionals.
Following this series of concessions and offensives, and coupled with the
strong economic rebound under CEPA, political confrontation cooled down.
But under the surface, social cleavages that had spawned the 2003 mobilization continued to deepen. Public resentment against big business-government
collusion erupted under Donald Tsang, and social polarization accelerated
under CEPA. The integration of Hong Kong and mainland China hastened
the relocation of businesses to China, jeopardizing both working class and
middle class jobs in Hong Kong. The huge inflow of Chinese capital inflated
the cost of living and created asset bubbles.6 The post-2003 economic boom,
therefore, mostly benefited the business elite and members of the older, propertied middle class. At the same time, the boom impaired the living standards
of the lower classes and younger middle class.7
Beijing’s hardening stance on Hong Kong’s transition to full democracy
in 2007–08 was paralleled by a growing political consciousness among the
younger generation following the mobilization against Article 23. This trend
facilitated the rise of new and more-radical democratic groups, including the
League of Social Democrats (LSD) and the Civic Party (CP), which stiffened
efforts to defend Hong Kong’s existing civil society and to demand universal
suffrage. Both groups performed impressively in the 2008 LegCo election as
brand new political organizations. In the meantime, a spate of community
movements organized by diverse groups of students and young intellectuals arose in an effort to resist efforts by government and big corporations to
destroy historic buildings, traditional neighborhoods, and natural wildlife
habitats to make way for profitable redevelopment projects.8
6. Chan Man Hong, “CEPA yu Xianggang Chanye Jingji Kongdonghua” [CEPA and the
hollowing out of Hong Kong industry and economy], Taiwan Guojia Zhengce Xuekan [Journal of
Taiwan National Policy] 3:7 (July 2009), pp. 39–44. See also Poon Che Cheong and Joe Wong Fuk
Kin, “Chong jianmi anpai kan Xianggang yu neidi de jingji jiegui” [On the economic integration
between Hong Kong and mainland from the perspective of CEPA], unpublished paper, Economics
Department, Hong Kong Shue Yan College, 2005, pp. 11–16.
7. Hong Kong Transition Project, “Protest and Post-80s Youth: Sources of Social Instability
in Hong Kong,” 2010, <http://www.hktp.org/list/>; see also Hung Ho-fung, “Uncertainties in the
Enclave,” New Left Review, series 2, no. 66 (November-December 2010), pp. 55–77.
8. Choi Dong Ho and Yan Kim Ho, Qixia Siyi: Dalangxiwan Baoweizhan [Seven warriors:
Battle for Tai Long Sai Wan] (Hong Kong: Up Publications, 2010); Agnes S. Ku, “Re-Making Places
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Together with this continuous mobilization of Hong Kong society, formal
freedom of speech has been more or less maintained throughout the postcolonial period, thanks to the successful resistance to the Article 23 legislation. But
many surveys do suggest that self-censorship among journalists and editors
has been rising, and the media has become more reluctant to criticize the governments of Hong Kong and China.9 This may be related to the mainstream
media’s reliance on investment from local business magnates, who serve as
Beijing’s proxies in ruling Hong Kong.
At the same time, however, the popularization of high speed Internet access
has facilitated the explosive growth of social movement activists’ independent
and alternative media. These media platforms, which openly scrutinize and
criticize the Hong Kong and Beijing governments, were instrumental to the
growth of the new radical wing of the democratic movement as well as the
spate of community mobilizations against redevelopment projects. Some of
these media outlets rival the most popular mainstream media. For instance,
hkreporter.com and MyRadio, both financed and run by Stephen Shiu, a prodemocracy businessman and charismatic talk show host, became a hugely
popular online discussion platform and the city’s second largest online radio
station, respectively.10 The traffic of the former is ranked 22nd in Hong Kong,
as surveyed by Alexa.com.
T H E E s ca l ati o n o f C o n te n ti o u s M o bili z ati o n
a n d B ei j i n g ’ s Dile m m a

The radicalization of the democratic movement and the rise of community
movements fighting redevelopment culminated in late 2009 and 2010. The
latter movements developed into a large-scale campaign against the construction of the Hong Kong-Guangzhou section of the national High Speed Rail
and Fashioning an Opposition Discourse: Struggle over the Star Ferry Pier and the Queen’s Pier
in Hong Kong,” Environment and Planning D: Space and Society 30:1 (2012), pp. 5–22; and Hung,
“Uncertainties in the Enclave.”
9. Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA), Shrinking Margins: Freedom of Expression in
Hong Kong since 1997 (Hong Kong: HKJA, 2007); idem, Survey on Press Freedom in Hong Kong
(Hong Kong: HKJA, 2007); and Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph M. Chan, “Professionalism, Political
Orientation, and Perceived Self-Censorship: A Survey Study of Hong Kong Journalists,” Issues and
Studies 44:1 (March 2008), pp. 205–38.
10. Ip Iam-chong, “Hong Kong: The Rise of a New Political Force,” Info-Rhizome: Report on
Independent Media in the Chinese-speaking World (2008/09) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong In-media,
2009), pp. 48–68.
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(HSR) system. Movement participants contended that the new railway would
destroy rural and urban communities within Hong Kong and that its unit
cost exceeded that of all other segments in the national system.
Since early 2009, small-scale protests by Choi Yuen villagers, whose
village would be demolished to make room for the Guangzhou-Hong Kong
Express Rail Link (XRL) construction announced in 2007, have escalated
into recurrent demonstrations by thousands of people. Besides drawing
villagers and residents in urban neighborhoods also facing disruption, these
demonstrations attracted many citizens outraged by the astronomical costs of
the hastily planned project (estimated at US$8.6 billion for a section of just
26 kilometers)11 as well as its extensive potential destruction of community life
and the natural environment. Some professional groups and pro-democratic
politicians argued that the XRL would only benefit vested real estate interests,
while overloading the local transportation system. Still, LegCo members
indirectly elected from professional and vested interests groups known as
functional constituencies (FCs) and usually allied with Beijing almost unanimously supported the government’s plan. Protesters in turn developed their
collective dissent into a quest for full democratization of LegCo through
abolishing all FC seats.
The legislative sessions designated for debating and voting on the government budget for the project in January 2010 drew almost 10,000 protesters.
They encircled and blockaded the LegCo building, nearly succeeding in
detaining government officials and pro-project legislators inside overnight.
Although the movement did not forestall the project in the end, its mobilizing capacity and potential to paralyze the government alarmed Beijing.
Officials in the Chinese capital had already been perturbed by the New Year’s
Eve actions of a group of young protesters, somewhat overlapping the antiXRL activists, who broke through a police cordon to briefly occupy the back
entrance to the Liaison Office, the de facto CCP headquarters in Hong Kong.
These young protesters demanded universal suffrage and release of the jailed
Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. What apparently worried Beijing most was
that through the spring of 2010, this emerging group joined hands with the
rising new democratic parties to precipitate a referendum movement, even
as the government debated political reforms centered on election methods
for the chief executive and for LegCo in 2012.
11. Cheng Wing-Gar Cheng and Wendy Leung, “Hong Kong Accepts $8.6 Billion China Rail
Link Budget,” Bloomberg, January 16, 2010.
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After Beijing denied any possibility of universal suffrage in 2007–08, the
democratic movement turned to demand universal suffrage in 2012. Then in
fall 2009, the HKSAR government put forward a political reform proposal
for the 2012 elections that ruled out universal suffrage. In reaction, the LSD,
later joined by the CP, facilitated a de facto 2010 referendum to mobilize,
galvanize, and manifest the will of the Hong Kong people for democracy,
pressuring Beijing to implement universal suffrage in 2012.12
The plan of the LSD and CP was that the referendum would be initiated by the resignation of their five directly elected legislative councilors,
each representing one of the five geographical constituencies covering all of
Hong Kong. Those legislators would then campaign to regain their seats in
the by-election, on the platform of universal suffrage. Each vote for any of
the five candidates would then be seen as equivalent to a vote in support of
the demand, turning the by-election into a referendum. Such a de facto
referendum would set a precedent for Hong Kong citizens to express their
collective will on significant issues in the future even though the SAR lacks a
formal referendum law such as Taiwan’s. Ultimately, the referendum materialized when the five legislators resigned in January 2010, and the by-election
for their seats was scheduled for May.
Beijing charged that the referendum movement was a road toward Hong
Kong independence. The Democratic Party, fearful of angering Beijing,
refused to participate and opted for secret negotiations with central Chinese
officials on modifying the SAR government’s political reform proposal. But
activists from community movements and alternative online media organizations participated to help get out the vote.
In the end, all five of the Democrats who resigned were reelected with
nearly 90% of the cast votes, and half a million citizens turned out to vote
despite an organized boycott of the by-election by the political establishment
and the moderate Democratic Party. In the aftermath of the referendum, the
young activists became ever more militant in their attempts to sabotage the
government public relations campaign that advertised the political reform
proposal. Public opinion polls showed that popular support for the government proposal eroded after the referendum, though it was not high to start
with.13
12. Hung, “Uncertainties in the Enclave.”
13. “Mindiao: Zhenggai zhichi diepo yiban” [Opinion poll: Support of government political
reform proposal dropped below 50%], Mingpao, June 15, 2011.

5 14 • A S I AN S U R V E Y 5 2 : 3

Such escalation of popular mobilization, like the 2003 actions that halted
the Article 23 legislation, forced Beijing to retreat. Officials finally accepted the
Democratic Party’s proposal for a piecemeal modification of the 2012 LegCo
election method that would increase the proportion of seats for directly elected
legislators. This again demonstrates how Beijing has had to retreat (albeit reluctantly) to ensure stability in Hong Kong, in the face of large-scale popular
mobilization. Later in the year there was a political rumor that Beijing was
pushing the Hong Kong government to relaunch the stalled Article 23 legislation before Donald Tsang finished his term as chief executive in 2012. But after
vociferous opposition by journalists, scholars, and opposition groups, Tsang
said the legislation would not appear on the agenda during the remainder of his
term.14 It is possible that Beijing started the rumor to test Hong Kong’s reaction,
only to delay the effort again after further mobilization loomed.
The waves of mobilization from the anti-Article 23 protest in 2003 to the
anti-XRL protest, as well as the referendum movement in 2010, show that
Hong Kong’s contentious civil society simply cannot be repressed. When
Hong Kong citizens began defending their civil society under Chinese sovereignty, their dissent started to resonate with rights activists and liberal intellectuals in mainland China. Chinese leaders repeatedly warned that Hong
Kong people should stay away from sensitive mainland affairs just like “well
water should not disturb river water” (jingshui bufan heshui). This resonance
is difficult to observe most of the time, but it became more visible at the
height of mobilization in 2010.
T H E R es o n a n c e o f H o n g K o n g ’ s De m o c r ati c M ov e m e n t i n
M a i n l a n d Chi n a

Given recent intensifying currents between Hong Kong and the mainland—
flow of visitors, circulation of information through high-speed Internet, and
exchanges among scholars, journalists, and activists—it is inconceivable that
Hong Kong’s vibrant civil society has lacked impact on the mainland. Still,
any such impact from mobilization upon China’s heavily constricted civil
society, where media and voluntary organizations are gripped tightly by the
party-state,15 was often presumed, and hard to observe. What is significant
14. Tsang Yum-kuen, The 2010–11 Policy Address: Sharing Prosperity for a Caring Society (Hong
Kong: Hong Kong Government, 2010), p. 48.
15. Nara Dillon, “Governing Civil Society: Adapting Revolutionary Methods to Serve PostCommunist Goals,” in Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in
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about the confrontational mobilization in 2010 is that its repercussions in
the mainland were overt, through both official media and the rising social
media there. For example, the discontent expressed in Hong Kong’s anti-XRL
movement helped arouse mainlanders’ interest in critical views on the national HSR project. A representative of such views was Zhao Jian, a professor
at Beijing Jiaotong University, who denounced the whole HSR project on
technological, financial, and safety grounds.16 When interviewed by Hong
Kong media, he openly expressed support for the anti-XRL movement in
Hong Kong, urging the activists to make use of the limited democratic system to stop the project.17 Zhao’s view was widely circulated among mainland
netizens, although he refused to comment further on the movement in Hong
Kong, probably because of pressure from the authorities.
The anti-XRL campaign was also highlighted in Southern Metropolitan
Daily (Nanfang dushi bao) and New Weekly (Xin zhoukan), the most popular
and liberal official newspapers and magazines in China, based in Guangzhou.
In late 2010, Southern Metropolitan Daily even granted the Annual Award
of Citizens to Choi Yuen villagers, the backbone of Hong Kong’s anti-XRL
mobilization. New Weekly selected the movement as one of the 2010 top 10
“spectated (weiguan) events.” This is a term coined by Chinese netizens to
refer to a disguised form of political participation using commentary, discussion, or reporting in cyberspace on controversial public events as a means to
evade state censorship. Such official media endorsement of Hong Kong’s antiXRL movement is intriguing because the movement’s actions recall many
cases of “rightful resistance” in the mainland against forced eviction and land
grabs by corrupt officials.18 Even though mainland media could hardly express
direct support for any type of rightful resistance within mainland China, its
sympathetic coverage of Hong Kong’s anti-XRL campaign can be seen as a
tacit endorsement of similar protests in the mainland.

China, ed. Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University,
Asia Center, 2011); Zhao Yuezhi, “Sustaining and Contesting Revolutionary Legacies in Media and
Ideology,” in ibid.
16. Zhao Jian, “Blind Pursuit Fails to Meet Needs,” China Daily, April 9, 2010, <http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-04/19/content_9745174_2.htm>.
17. “Beijing Academic Urges Hong Kong Lawmakers to Block Costly Express Rail Link,” South
China Morning Post, October 4, 2009.
18. For discussion of “rightful resistance” in China, see Kevin O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, Rightful
Resistance in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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Apart from mainstream media, nascent social media such as Twitter and
Sina Weibo19 provided vast new platforms for Chinese citizens to exchange
views and information about variegated public affairs. The scope and speed of
information flow over the Internet made censorship more difficult.20 During
the anti-XRL campaign, Southern Metropolitan Daily even sent a correspondent to Hong Kong to follow developments. These concerned mainlanders and their Hong Kong counterparts established the common hashtag
“#stopxrl” to live-tweet rallies against the XRL, allowing mainland netizens to
follow the mobilization in real time and express solidarity. Many well-known
liberal bloggers openly supported the anti-XRL campaign. One of them, Li
Puman, equated the anger of the anti-HSR campaigners to the fury of mainland citizens whose lives were uprooted by reckless development. Li expanded
his support of the anti-XRL movement to the level of supporting universal
suffrage in Hong Kong in his blog: “Usually, the government would tell the
masses about an apparently bright future, and then let the people pay for
the bill [of development]. It doesn’t matter whether such a bright future will
ever come; by the time of disillusion, ordinary people can do nothing. . . . In
a Hong Kong that has no universal suffrage, what can the people do?”21
Mainlanders’ attention to Hong Kong’s mobilization is not confined to nonpolitical issues like the anti-XRL movement; it extends to highly sensitive and
political problems as well, such as the campaign demanding the release of
China’s political prisoners. In the New Year rally of 2010 mentioned above that
ended in the storming of Hong Kong’s CCP headquarters, thousands of Hong
Kong citizens demanded the release of internationally known political prisoner
Liu Xiaobo. Tweeters from Hong Kong, mainland China, and Taiwan reported
the whole event live on the Internet and pushed the hashtag “#0101hk” into one
of the top spots of items discussed on Twitter that day. This is probably the most
conspicuous cooperation in the past 20 years between citizens of Hong Kong
and mainland China on political issues. In general, liberal mainland Internet
19. The micro-blogging market in China is dominated by Sina and Tencent, which have provided
weibo (microblog) services after Twitter was blocked in June 2009. Yet, mainland Chinese people
reach Twitter through proxies, VPNs (virtual private networks), and other tools to get around the
Great Firewall.
20. Yang Guobin, The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
21. Author’s own translation. Cited in Xin Yu, “Xianggang Fan Gaotie Xingdong Xiaoying
Chixu Dalu Wangmin Wangluo Shengyun” [Impact of Hong Kong anti-HSR actions continues and
mainland netizens offered their support online]. Radio Free Asia, January 19, 2010, <http://www.rfa.
org/mandarin/yataibaodao/gaotie-01192010101249.html>.
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users became increasingly interested in political activism in Hong Kong and
supported its democratic movement. For example, Ran Yunfei, a nationally
renowned blogger based in Sichuan Province, once noted that “Free Hong
Kong is also ours” (Ziyoude Xianggang yeshi womende).22
Apart from communication via the Internet, the geographical and cultural
proximity of Hong Kong to South China also helped spread dissident views,
political idioms, and protest repertoires to the mainland. This was illustrated
in the “Pro-Cantonese Campaign” (Cheng Yueyu Yundong) in the summer
of 2010 that invoked the shared vernacular culture and local identity across
the Pearl River Delta. In July, the deputy director of the Guangzhou Political
Consultation Committee suggested that local television channels should switch
from using Cantonese to Putonghua (Mandarin Chinese) in their prime-time
shows during the coming Asian Games. This suggestion was taken by local
people in Guangzhou as a culmination of the government project over the
past 15 years to promote official Mandarin in place of local Cantonese dialects.
In response, Guangzhou netizens organized a “Defending Cantonese” rally on
July 11 at the People’s Park of Guangzhou. They mobilized through the Internet;
hundreds of citizens showed up, an impressive turnout in Guangzhou. Because
Hong Kong has been the powerhouse of media and popular culture, nurturing
several generations of Cantonese-based culture in the Pearl River Delta region,
it is no surprise that the young Guangzhou protesters, mostly in their teens and
twenties, sang Cantopop songs from Hong Kong throughout the rally. What is
remarkable is that many of them even chanted in Cantonese modified political
slogans that originated in the referendum movement in Hong Kong. During the
referendum movement, the government advertised its conservative proposal for
political reform through a public relations slogan, “Set Sail Political Reform!”
(Zhenggai Qimao), while the radical democrats used the slogan “Go Bust Political Reform!” (Zhenggai Shoupi) against the government proposal. In the Defending Cantonese rally, the most visible slogan was “Set Sail Cantonese, Go Bust
Mandarin!” (Guangdonghua Qimao, Putonghua Shoupi). After the July 11 rally,
the netizens organized another on July 25; close to 10,000 citizens showed up,
manifesting more intense passion than at the preceding one.
After several Hong Kong activists and citizen reporters joined the July 25
protests in Guangzhou, netizens in both cities co-organized a concurrent demonstration on August 1. The Guangzhou government was on high alert and
22. Ran Yunfei, “Ziyoude Xianggang Yeshi Womende” <https://ranyunfei.com/2010/01/1010.
htm>.
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warned of a crackdown. Despite the warning, more than 1,000 Guangzhou
citizens appeared and demonstrated along Beijing Road in downtown. In Hong
Kong, about 500 protesters marched to the government headquarters in support of their compatriots in Guangzhou. Guangzhou police did not crack down
on the campaigners, only detaining a few organizers for questioning. After
provincial officials in Guangdong guaranteed that Cantonese would continue
to be respected and there was no plan to eliminate its use in local official media,
the movement in Guangzhou subsided. This episode is remarkable: it was the
first time since 1989 that mainland and Hong Kong activists took to the streets
for the same cause. The spread of political slogans from Hong Kong to Guangzhou indicates that contentious mobilization in Hong Kong’s civil society has
been closely watched, admired, and appropriated by citizens in the mainland.
The campaign in support of Ai Weiwei, an internationally renowned Chinese artist and activist arrested by the Chinese government at the height of its
crackdown on an incipient homegrown “Jasmine Revolution” in April 2011,
also illustrates the new dynamic of cross-border activism between Hong Kong
and the mainland. Openly requesting Ai’s release in the mainland is politically
impossible, but in Hong Kong, beyond the routine protests by human rights
activists and democrats, many young activists and artists initiated a street
art campaign that spread to the mainland. These activists, calling themselves
“art citizens” (yishu gongmin) created graffiti drawings of Ai accompanied
by slogans such as "Free Ai Weiwei" and "Who's Afraid of Ai Weiwei?" in
public areas all over the city. Very soon, similar graffiti appeared in a number
of mainland cities.23
The influence on the mainland of the new political culture emerging
among younger generations of Hong Kong activists is unmistakable. We
will see in the next section that blossoming alongside this occasional interaction is a more-institutionalized dynamic between Hong Kong and mainland
civil societies.
M a i n l a n d C H I NA’ s O f f sh o re Ci v il S o c iety i n H o n g K o n g

As we showed earlier, following the sovereignty handover Beijing clamped
down on Hong Kong’s civil society, calling it a “subversive base”—to no avail.
Beijing’s failed effort to eliminate Hong Kong’s civil liberties was marked
23. “Beijing Jingxian Ting Ai, Manyan Chüanguo” [Graffiti supporting Ai appeared in Beijing
and spread to the whole country], Apple Daily (Hong Kong), April 25, 2011.
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by the successful mobilization against the Article 23 legislation in 2003 and
its indefinite delay after 2010. The vibrant civil society of Hong Kong, despite its inability to push forward significant policy changes, has been effective so far in defending the liberty of the SAR.24 This liberal political space
stands poised to facilitate the development of civil society in mainland China
through variegated channels. These include participation of mainland visitors
in Hong Kong’s political activities, facilitation of mainland-oriented nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Hong Kong, exposure of more and
more mainland students to Hong Kong’s civic debate about China, and the
operation of relatively liberal mainland media organization in Hong Kong.
As protests, rallies, and assemblies have continued to be part of the daily
routine in Hong Kong post-1997, they have also become “tourist attractions”
for mainland Chinese visitors, whose numbers soared after Beijing loosened
control over mainlanders’ visits under CEPA. The annual count of mainlanders’ visits to Hong Kong jumped from 12.25 million in 2003 to 22.47 million
in 2010.25 Some of these tourists are susceptible to the influences of the culture
of Hong Kong’s civil society. Increasing participation of mainland visitors in
the annual June 4 candlelight vigil in Hong Kong commemorating Tiananmen is a case in point.
Since the first anniversary of the crackdown in 1990, the candlelight vigil
rally at Victoria Park in the Causeway Bay District has become a regular
venue at which organizations concerned about human rights in China hold
forums and distribute publications. A noteworthy trend, as noted by local
media, is the increasing presence of mainland tourists joining the vigil. Time
and again, the SAR government has tried to discourage citizens’ participation,
denouncing the 1989 student movement as subversive or repressing part of
the commemoration, for example, in 2010 when police moved to confiscate a
re-creation of the Goddess of Democracy statue.26 But these moves by officials
have backfired, only driving up the number of vigil attendees (see Table 1).
At the same time, a wide variety of rights groups and other NGOs
dedicated to progressive change in mainland China have been settling in
24. Ma Ngok, “Social Movement and State-Society Relationship in Hong Kong,” in Social
Movements in China and Hong Kong: The Expansion of Protest Space, ed. Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce and
Gilles Guiheux (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), pp. 45–64.
25. Hong Kong Tourism Board, Annual Report 2004/2005 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Tourism
Board, 2005), p. 31; and idem, “Release of Provisional Visitor Arrivals for 2010,” press release, January 7, 2011.
26. The police returned the statue to protesters a few days after confiscation.
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table 1. Number of Attendees of the Candlelight Vigil on June 4, 1990–2011
Year

2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990

Police’s Figure

HKASPDM’s Figure

77,000
113,000
62,000
15,000
27,000
19,000
22,000
48,000
Not available
18,000
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
16,000
16,000
12,000
10,000
28,000
60,000
80,000

150,000
150,000
150,000
48,000
55,000
44,000
45,000
82,000
50,000
45,000
48,000
45,000
70,000
40,000
55,000
45,000
35,000
45,000
40,000
80,000
100,000
150,000

source: Joseph M. Chan and Francis L. F. Lee, “Why Can’t Hong Kong Forget
the June 4th Incident? Media, Social Organization, Nation-State, and Collective
Memory,” Mass Communication Research 103 (April 2010), pp. 215–59, p. 218; Ming
Pao, June 5, 2010, and June 5, 2011.

Hong Kong since late colonial times. This trend was not interrupted by
the sovereignty handover. Groups including Human Rights Monitor and
Amnesty International (Hong Kong) have been active in public education, disseminating reports on Chinese human rights conditions. Labor
groups emerging from within Hong Kong, such as Students and Scholars
against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM), have organized campaigns to
investigate working conditions and advocate labor rights in mainland
factories.
Chinese political exiles have also set up their own groups in the city.
Han Dongfang, a well-known labor union organizer during the Tiananmen
protests of 1989, was arrested, imprisoned, and expelled to Hong Kong in
1993. He founded China Labor Bulletin to collect and disseminate information about Chinese labor activism. Han has maintained and expanded
contacts with labor activists, lawyers, and intellectuals in the mainland and
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worked closely with international labor organizations. His operation in Hong
Kong remains intact thus far. The Center for Human Rights and Democracy,
set up by Lu Siqing, another 1989 activist, is a news agency in Hong Kong
specializing in Chinese human rights. Other repressed voices from mainland
China, such as the banned religious organization Falun Gong as well as various victims of forced eviction and official corruption, are often heard in Hong
Kong. The above-mentioned groups and individuals can freely produce and
circulate their publications, many of which are deliberately distributed to
visiting mainland tourists. The continued existence of these people, groups,
and outlets in Hong Kong, made possible by the people’s struggles against
the legal and political restrictions on civil rights and freedom such as Article
23 legislation, has created an offshore civil society for China.
Besides providing a platform for civic participation in China, Hong Kong
is also becoming a support center for China’s nascent NGO sector. Since the
1995 Beijing Conference on Women, the Chinese government has allowed
a homegrown NGO sector to develop as a response to the demands of the
international community. But this sector is still subject to strict governmental
surveillance, restriction, and occasional crackdowns. Many NGOs also confront difficulties in registration, fund-raising, recruitment, and institutional
development. Some prefer to register as associations or corporations in Hong
Kong and look for local and international funding sources. At the same time,
many international NGOs, such as Greenpeace and Oxfam, have used Hong
Kong as a base and springboard for their development in mainland China
since the 1990s.
Hong Kong is not merely a meeting place for local, international, and
mainland NGOs. It also functions as a learning center for mainland activists.
Hong Kong academics and NGO professionals organize capacity-building
programs for Chinese NGO campaigners, administrators, and volunteers to
help them develop tactical and organizational skills for their engagement with
the Chinese government. For instance, the Center for Civil Society Studies, affiliated with the Chinese University of Hong Kong, has been working
closely with mainland NGOs, universities, and local governments on NGOrelated training, research, and consultancy. The actual outcome is yet to be
seen, but in the long run these cross-border NGO networks will certainly
contribute to the development of Chinese civil society.
In the meantime, as illustrated by Table 2, the soaring number of mainland
students and scholars in Hong Kong universities in recent years has spawned
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table 2. Share of Mainland Students in Total Enrollment in Hong Kong Universities, 1996–2001
Year

1996/97
1997/98
1998/99
1999/00
2000/01
2001/02
2002/03
2003/04
2004/05
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11

Mainland Undergraduate
Student as % of Total

0
0
0.1
0.4
0.7
1.1
1.3
1.7
2.5
3.9
5.7
6.9
7.9
8.1
8.1

Mainland Postgraduate
Student as % of Total

5.5
6.3
6.4
7.1
7.4
9.2
10.4
12.6
15.6
21.3
26.8
29.8
33.9
38.9
40.7

All Mainland Students
as % of Total

1.3
1.5
1.6
2.0
2.3
3.0
3.5
4.3
5.2
7.0
9.2
10.6
11.9
12.7
13.0

source: Hong Kong Transition Project, Calm after the Storm? p. 90.

a new dynamic in local and mainland intellectual circles. Many of these
mainland students, trained to be very cautious in expressing their political
views, are exposed to the culture of free political discussion in Hong Kong.
In 2009, Chan Yi-Ngor, president of the Student Union of Hong Kong
University, denounced the 1989 Beijing student movement and accused its
leaders of causing chaos in Tiananmen Square. He said that they should be
responsible for the resulting bloody confrontation. He expressed support for
the government crackdown and denigrated the student leaders as “runaway
student leaders.” Some local students and alumni from the university found
Chan's remarks disrespectful to the victims of 1989 and launched a campaign
to recall him. The ensuing heated debates and recall referendum involved
many mainland students who had learned little about the Tiananmen Square
incident during their previous political education. No matter which side they
supported, it was their first opportunity to engage freely in public discussion
through open forums and “democracy walls,” an established institution for
public discussions among university students in Hong Kong since the 1970s.
Historically speaking, these walls also continue the legacy of the “Democracy
Wall Movement” and the “Beijing Spring” phenomena in China.
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Some mainland students have even transformed themselves into active
participants in Hong Kong’s democratic culture. For example, following the
July 2011 HSR accident in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, that killed at least
40 passengers, Hong Kong media vociferously expressed skepticism about the
official explanation for the accident and questioned the government’s rescue
effort as well as the handling of the train wreck. Mainland media were equally
critical initially, only to be muted later while Hong Kong’s coverage and debate continued. Apparently influenced by this persistently critical concern, 10
mainland students in Hong Kong issued an online petition letter requesting
Beijing to fully investigate the accident.27
In another example, the visit of Vice Premier Li Keqiang to Hong Kong
University on August 18, 2011, instigated a heated debate in Hong Kong
because of the exceptionally high level of security during the visit. The local
police took over campus security, preemptively detained would-be student
protesters, and restricted media access to the venue during Li’s visit. Comparing this heavy-handed approach to more relaxed security during earlier visits
to Hong Kong universities by Chinese leaders, many local commentators and
politicians lamented the increasing disrespect for civil liberties and the law by
the police. Alumni and students meanwhile expressed resentment over the
university’s loss of dignity, autonomy, and freedom stemming from the police
takeover of campus security and aggressiveness toward student protestors.
During a rally that denounced the police action attended by thousands of
Hong Kong University alumni, faculty, and students, at least two mainland
students stepped forward to address the participants. They spoke about how
they valued Hong Kong as the last bastion of liberty and freedom of speech
in China, how they appreciated the feeling of “liberation” once they arrived
in Hong Kong, and how important the defense of such public space is.28
Despite persistent worries in Hong Kong about the erosion of civil liberties in general, and the loss of freedom of speech through manipulation of
local media by pro-Beijing elites in particular,29 Hong Kong is becoming an
alternative Chinese media hub where relatively liberal Chinese media organizations can target a mainland audience. The Chinese media industry, which
27. “Liugang Neidi Sheng Lianshu Cucha Dongche Canju” [Mainland students in Hong Kong
petition for investigation of high speed rail tragedy], Apple Daily, August 3, 2011.
28. “Shouhu Zhongguo Zuihou Ziyoudi” [To protect that last land of freedom in China],
Mingpao, August 28, 2011.
29. HKJA, Shrinking Margins.
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has rapidly marketized since the 1990s, is still subject to official censorship
and ownership control. Some Chinese media workers and investors with
connections to official media and the Chinese government have moved to
Hong Kong seeking more room to maneuver, being unable to operate freely
in the mainland.
Phoenix Television, founded in 1996, is a Hong Kong-based Putonghua
satellite television broadcaster serving the Greater China market. Its shareholders include media and telecommunications companies from China, and
well-connected elites such as its chief executive officer (CEO) and founder
Liu Changle, who reportedly has a background with the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA). Phoenix Television’s 24-hour news channel, established in 2001,
covers news from mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, including events
not covered by mainland media such as elections and protests in Taiwan and
Hong Kong. In 2003, the firm was granted landing rights (i.e., permission
to have its satellite signals received) by the Chinese State Administration
of Radio, Films, and Television (SARFT). Many of Phoenix TV’s anchors
and talk show hosts such as Dou Wentao, Xu Zhidong, and Leung Mantao
(Liang Wendao) are not shy about commenting on sensitive topics. Among
them, Leung is an exemplar of the new Hong Kong-China cultural dynamic.
Having grown up in Hong Kong and Taiwan, he has been active in cultural
criticism and social activism since the 1990s. Late in that decade, he began to
work as host and guest speaker for public affairs programs reaching millions
of mainland viewers including Behind the Headlines with Wentao on Phoenix
TV. With his knowledge, eloquence, and humor, he has established himself
as a prominent critic of China’s government, social malaises, and cultural
phenomena. He has contributed to major official newspapers, and his books
have ranked high on the best-seller charts in the mainland.
Sun Television, founded in 2000, is another Hong Kong-based satellite
television company targeting a mainland Chinese audience. In 2005, Chen
Ping, a businessman who was a liberal think-tank intellectual in the 1980s and
left his position in the Chinese government after 1989, acquired the company
from the couple Wu Zheng and Yang Lan, a pro-Beijing businessman and
an ex-CCTV (China Central Television) anchor, respectively. Chen recruited
a number of Chinese liberal intellectuals as talk show hosts and released
independent documentaries, some of which were produced by social and
cultural activists such as Ai Weiwei and Ai Xiaoming. After Sun Television’s
landing rights were revoked by SARFT in November 2010, likely because
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its programs often conveyed dissident views, it moved its headquarters from
Shanghai to Hong Kong. As Chen has noted, his company is attempting to
take advantage of Hong Kong’s freedom and rule of law to establish independent media for exchange and propagation of cultural ideas and political
views.30 Although Sun cannot legally broadcast in the mainland, mainland
residents can still freely receive its satellite signal, watch its programs online,
and read its online magazine.
Another new contribution of Hong Kong to Chinese media is book publishing. Hong Kong, not subject to any political censorship in publication,
is fertile ground for publishing houses targeting mainland readers; publishers offer popular titles ranging from exposés of mainland corruption and
collections of confidential official documents such as The Tiananmen Papers
to controversial memoirs such as Mao: The Untold Story and Zhao Ziyang’s
memoirs. Many local bookstores, particularly those in the airport, and souvenir shops in tourist hotspots are filled with mainland visitors perusing their
stocks of politically sensitive books banned in the mainland. Mainland visitors now account for more than half of the sales of many titles. Attendance
of mainlanders at Hong Kong’s annual book fair has grown so rapidly that
since 2009 the organizer has promoted the event in mainland China as a
tourist attraction.31
In sum, we see that the persistence of civil society and general political
freedom in Hong Kong, despite stagnation and setbacks in the city’s democratization, is turning Hong Kong into the only place in China where the
CCP government can be criticized overtly. Sensitive political histories like
the 1989 democratic movement can be freely discussed, and reports about dissidents and conflicts in China can be openly circulated. With the intensifying
economic and social integration between Hong Kong and mainland China
and the mounting inflow of mainland visitors, including scholars, students,
NGO activists, and journalists, the existence of such civil society will not
only shape the political development of Hong Kong but also that of China.
Indeed, it is not only a civil society of Hong Kong but also an emerging civil
society for mainland China.
30. Zhang Jieping, “Yangguang Weishi Nianju Ganyan Liliang” [Sun Television consolidates the
power of courage to speak], Yazhou Zhoukan [Asia Weekly] 24:40, October 10, 2010, <http://www.
yzzk.com/cfm/Content_Archive.cfm?Channel=br&Path=2235488802/40br1a.cfm>.
31. Jonathan Cheng, “China’s Bookstore: Why the Chinese-reading World Still Flocks to Hong
Kong,” Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124770567529348929.
html>.
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C o n c l u si o n

According to the Sino-British Joint Declaration and later the Basic Law, the
status quo of Hong Kong, including its civil liberties and political freedom
established since the 1970s and 1980s, should remain “unchanged” after retrocession in 1997 for at least 50 years. The same documents also promised
continuous democratization of Hong Kong’s government until the realization
of universal suffrage. These promises, together with the fear that Hong Kong
would be politically and culturally assimilated into the mainland, became
the impetus for the democratic movement. This movement, built upon the
vibrant civil society that sprang up in the form of variegated social movements
and critical journalism in the 1970s, has been striving to defend preexisting
political freedom in Hong Kong and since late colonial times has demanded
genuine universal suffrage.
Under Beijing’s constraint that it could not resort to open repression in
dealing with the democratic movement, together with Hong Kong’s role
as China’s offshore financial center and its utility as a showcase of “one
country, two systems” to Taiwan, Hong Kong’s democratic movement and
civil society have proven to be tenacious. Still, with the entrenched alliance
between Beijing and the Hong Kong business elite against democratization,
progress toward universal suffrage has been disappointing. Many activists
now believe that genuine universal suffrage in Hong Kong will never come
unless China democratizes. On the other hand, the democratic movement so
far has succeeded in defending Hong Kong’s established civil society against
Beijing’s attempt to tighten its control. This success was possible because
Beijing yielded to popular pressure, and the repressive Article 23 legislation
was delayed, once in 2003 and again in 2010. Such legislation, if implemented, would destroy the foundation of Hong Kong’s civil society, including
freedom of speech and freedom of association.
Hong Kong’s growing civil society under Chinese rule is becoming
mainland China’s offshore civil society. The case of Hong Kong complicates
the conventional definition of the term “civil society,” which usually refers
to an ethical-political community of citizens under a system of rule and
bounded by its territory.32 On the contrary, Hong Kong’s civil society, as an
32. Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1994), pp. 84–87.
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offshore space, resides simultaneously inside and outside China’s sovereign
power. It not only inspires rights activists, bloggers, and liberal intellectuals in the mainland but serves them as a clearinghouse for information and
ideas. Hong Kong is also a hub of NGOs and media organizations from the
mainland and for the mainland. Rights activists and liberal intellectuals from
there are shrewdly taking advantage of this unique space to connect with one
another, with the outside world, and with their audiences. It is still too early
to tell how much this offshore civil society can contribute to social and political change in the mainland, but its potential should not be underestimated.
The accelerating social and economic integration between Hong Kong and
mainland China that sends hundreds of thousands of mainland scholars,
students, and other visitors to Hong Kong every year is exposing them to
opportunities for political participation and civic exchange unimaginable at
home.
Historically, Hong Kong played a similar role as an offshore civil society
in Chinese politics at the turn of the twentieth century. The border was wide
open, and modern China’s founder Sun Yat-sen, together with many other
Chinese reformists and revolutionaries, used the British colony’s relatively free
political space to advocate and struggle for change in China.
The continuous survival and growth of Hong Kong’s civil society today,
however, is not guaranteed by any stable institutional arrangement. It is contingent upon the ability of local citizens to defeat repeated attempts by Beijing
to wrap Hong Kong in an authoritarian straitjacket. It is nearly certain that
Beijing will try again to rein in this space by reenacting the Article 23 legislation, which will again trigger resistance and contentious mobilization among
Hong Kong citizens. Given the increasing significance of Hong Kong’s civil
society to the mainland, the stakes of any prospective conflict will be much
higher than the political development of Hong Kong alone. This will be an
organic part of the battle over the long run for political reform in China.
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